Chemical Regulations and the Effect on Manufacturers by Smith, Dustin
Murray State's Digital Commons 
Integrated Studies Center for Adult and Regional Education 
Fall 2019 
Chemical Regulations and the Effect on Manufacturers 
Dustin Smith 
dsmith1119@wk.net 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.murraystate.edu/bis437 
Recommended Citation 
Smith, Dustin, "Chemical Regulations and the Effect on Manufacturers" (2019). Integrated Studies. 246. 
https://digitalcommons.murraystate.edu/bis437/246 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Adult and Regional Education at Murray 
State's Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Integrated Studies by an authorized administrator of 
Murray State's Digital Commons. For more information, please contact msu.digitalcommons@murraystate.edu. 










Chemical Regulations and the Effect on Manufacturers 
Dustin E. Smith 














This paper examines two major regulatory systems chemists and chemical manufacturers 
must deal with on a day-to-day basis. There are dozens of different sets of regulations that 
affect the chemical industry throughout the world. Many countries have their own specific 
rules that govern the chemicals manufactured or imported inside their borders. Specifically, 
this paper will examine the rise of the European Union’s REACH system, the failure and 
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Chemical Regulations and the Effect on Manufacturers 
  When a person sets out to become a chemist, they could reasonably expect to become 
well versed with concepts such as hydroxyl numbers, nucleophiles and free radicals over the 
course of their chemistry careers. Designing, analyzing and evaluating chemical compounds 
would be typical expectations of a chemist starting work at a manufacturing company once they 
complete their education. And for the most part, that would be true. But a manufacturing 
company may expect more from their new employees in areas not covered in a traditional 
university curriculum. The new employee may be expected to become an expert on the many 
chemical regulations that govern exactly where and how a chemical manufacturer can legally sell 
their products. 
According to R. Auerbach, who has been working with chemical regulations since 1976, 
there are multiple different regulatory systems throughout the world. Several of these systems 
have recently undergone major reform, such as: the European Union’s REACH, the United 
States’ TSCA, Korea’s new K-REACH, Taiwan’s updated TCSCA, and several food contact 
related regulations. China, Thailand and Turkey were also working to update and revise their 
regulatory law, which were expected to generate updated requirements in the near future 
(personal communication, September 11, 2019). Chemical regulatory laws have been and will be 
an expanding area of emphasis for industrial manufacturing for the foreseeable future.   
To understand these regulatory systems may require a person to have assumed a lawyer’s 
mindset rather than a chemist’s. These regulations were mostly designed by the various countries 
and regions to protect their citizens and preserve the natural environment from a wide variety of 
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dangerous substances. This examination will cover just some of the complex labyrinth of 
regulations governing chemical manufacturers and the reasons that have made them necessary. 
The specific regulatory systems this paper will focus on are the European Union’s REACH, the 
United States’ TSCA, the effects they have had on one another and their influence throughout the 
world. 
European Chemical Regulatory Systems 
According to Mork and Hansson (2007), the European Union established the beginnings 
of chemical regulation in 1967. A harmonized system for the classification and labeling of 
chemicals was agreed upon by the member states and was enacted. During the 1970’s, European 
countries had extended discussions over chemical unknowns and the need to find better 
solutions. In 1981, European countries conducted a chemical inventory, and it was discovered 
that the global chemical market consisted of an astounding 100,000 plus chemicals (Lewis, 
Kazantzis, Fishtik & Wilcox, 2006).  
This discovery spurred European countries to create their own individual regulatory 
systems. It was agreed by the European Union member states when a chemical on the market 
before September 1981, it was considered as pre-existing. The existing chemicals did not 
necessarily have to be evaluated for health and environmental effects according to the agreement. 
These pre-existing chemicals were placed on a chemical inventory list known as the European 
Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical Substances, or EINECS. The list was only open for 
a one-time mass addition and then the inventory list was considered closed  (Mork & Hansson, 
2007).  
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A separate, more rigorous regulatory listing was created for any chemical that entered the 
market after the 1981 deadline. These chemicals were considered new for the purposes of 
inventory listings. These new chemicals were “to be tested for their effects on human health and 
the environment” (Van Hemmen, 2009, p. 561). Lewis et al. (2006) state that since the 
introduction of these new regulations, only around 3,000 new chemicals had been fully brought 
onto the market. The approximately 3,000 chemicals only represent “about 1% of the total 
production volume” of all of Europe (Mork & Hansson, 2007, p. 23).  
  New chemicals suffered when compared to the EINECS listed chemicals due to the 
uncertainty behind the testing and the ensuing risk assessment results. This uncertainty was “not 
particularly conducive to innovation because of the different rules” (Lahl & Hawxwell, 2006, p. 
7116). "Many believed that the lack of regulatory obstacles for the use of existing chemicals had 
stifled innovation because it was expensive for the chemicals industry to perform research on 
novel chemical alternatives” (Williams, Panko & Paustenbach, 2009, p. 555). Williams et al. 
describe that these novel chemical alternatives would have fallen under the far stricter 
regulations and were not worth the extra effort and cost to chemical companies. The regulatory 
testing results on new chemicals has not produced “sufficient information or sound chemical risk 
assessment practices pertaining to the environment. Furthermore, whenever the associated risks 
of these substances have been identified, the implementation of risk management measures has 
been unacceptably slow” (Lewis et al., 2006, p. 593).    
European Regulatory Reform 
During the 1990’s, an effort was launched by the European Council to evaluate the risks 
associated with the high-volume chemicals on the EINECS list. Mork and Hansson (2007) stated 
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that these risk assessments were to be handled by expert committees from the field of chemistry. 
From 1993-2005, these committees performed risk assessments for 130 chemicals, 71 of which 
were completed and 58 required their assessments to be modified to reduce the associated risks. 
Or put another way, almost 45% of the high-volume chemicals tested from the grandfathered 
EINECS list needed additional safety measures to be implemented. 
Several things were becoming clear to the European governments that “chemical 
producers know too little about the environmental and human safety of the substances they 
produce” (Lahl & Hawxwell, 2006, p. 7116).  The regulatory systems in place were affecting 
“patterns of research activity and innovation, causing the European chemical industry to lag 
behind its main counterparts in the US and Japan” (Lewis et al., 2006, p. 593).  With human, 
environmental, and financial health on the line, the need for reliable chemical data was becoming 
critical.  
As stated by Mork and Hansson (2007), in February 2001, a report titled Strategy for a 
Future Chemicals Policy was released. This report, commonly called the White Paper, outlined 
the concepts and needs for a new European chemical policy. Mork and Hansson summarize the 
White Paper’s goals as follows:   
• Protection of human health and the environment. 
• Maintenance and enhancement of the competitiveness of the EU chemical 
industry. 
• Prevent fragmentation of the internal market.  
• Increased transparency.  
• Integration with international efforts. 
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• Promotion of non-animal testing.  
• Conformity with EU international obligations under the WTO (2007, pp. 23-24).  
Another major finding of the White Paper, according to Fisher (2014), was that the 
society of the world must have chemicals. The everyday reliance on chemically-manufactured 
products was complete and total. Along with these findings, the White Paper lamented that there 
were entirely too many unknown chemicals present that were affecting the environment and 
human health. “The primary focus of the White Paper was thus upon the generation of 
information” (Fisher, 2014, p. 167). 
REACH 
When legislation was brought up for debate, “the European Parliament identified 
REACH as the single most important dossier ever to be discussed within its walls” (Heyvaert, 
2009, p. 113). The original bill was toned down and concessions were made. “Industrial lobbying 
did achieve the alleviation of some of the initially planned regulatory requirements” (Heyvaert, 
2009, p. 114). But the lobbying effort did not stop the vast majority of the legislation. So, despite 
international and industrial complaints and concerns, “the REACH Regulation (Regulation (EC) 
No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning 
the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), 
establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/4, 2006), entered into 
force in 2007” (Karamertzanis et al., 2019, p. 303).  
Lahl and Hawxwell (2006) stated that this revolutionized system consolidated more than 
forty individual sets of regulatory laws into one legislation. This helped to limit confusion and 
increase the European Union’s ability to focus on enforcing one single system of laws. The old 
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EINECS system of new and existing chemicals was no more. All chemicals were now 
considered as new under REACH. 
According to Williams et al. (2009), the main goals of REACH were: 
1. Compile a suite of physicochemical, toxicological, and ecotoxicological data for 
each substance. 
2. Establish safe usage parameters by conducting chemical safety assessments 
(CSAs). 
3. Allow for regulatory evaluation of substances to determine potential hazards 
based on the compiled data.  
4. Prevent the use of substances of very high concern (SVHCs) without the approval 
of the European Chemicals Agency. 
5. Restrict the use of chemicals for which no safe usage parameters can be 
established (p. 555).  
When REACH legislation was passed, it was around 700 pages long (Lahl & Hawxwell, 
2006). As a regulatory system, REACH was “one of the most difficult to understand, and that 
difficulty is not primarily due to its length” (Lahl & Hawxwell, 2006, p. 7116). Van Hemmen 
(2009) noted that REACH guidance documents were plentiful and numbered over 6,000 pages at 
the time. However, the legislation’s length was minuscule when compared to the supporting 
paperwork that has been generated by each registrant. 
Tonnage Bands 
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Forbes (2009) stated “any manufacturer or importer of a substance, either on its own or in 
one or more preparation(s), in quantities of one tonne or more per year, shall submit a 
registration to the Agency” (p. 35). Forbes continues to describe that different phase-in deadlines 
were put in place to for these registrations. Imports and manufacturing weights of 100 tonnes or 
more of a chemical that had previously been listed on the EINECS list had to be registered by 
May 31, 2013. This was required for each company that intended to manufacture or import the 
chemical into the European Union. If a chemical fell between one and 100 tonnes, the deadline 
for registration was delayed until May 31, 2018. The largest quantities of 1,000 tonnes or more 
had the much shorter registration deadline date set at November 30, 2010. 
Exemptions 
Of course, there were exemptions to the required REACH registration. Substances 
manufactured or imported in amounts less than one tonne (1,000 kgs) per year did not have to be 
registered (Williams et al., 2009). “Substances used in medications for humans or animals, or in 
foodstuffs or feeds” were exempted primarily because they are regulated by other European 
Union laws (Lahl & Hawxwell, 2006, p. 7117). And “polymers are exempted as well from the 
requirement to register since they usually are not very hazardous” (Van Hemmen, 2009, p. 562). 
Van Hemmen also listed some additional exempted substances, which are commonly found in 
the environment. Some of these examples are oxygen, cellulose pulp, water, minerals and noble 
gases.  
Williams et al. (2009) note the chemical ingredients, also known as monomers, which are 
reacted to create polymers must be registered. One exemption to this would be if a monomer 
made up less than two percent of a product’s composition and the monomer’s total weight in that 
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product was imported in less than one metric tonne per year. Then product containing the 
monomer could be shipped into REACH regulated countries and the monomer would be exempt 
from registration filing as related by R. Auerbach (personal communication, September 11, 
2019).  
R. Auerbach noted that some non-European Union companies were willing to extend 
their company’s REACH registration coverage to customers for certain chemicals. The 
customers in this case would purchase a registered raw material from the supplier, use the raw 
material in their manufacture and then would import the finished product into the European 
Union under the raw material supplier’s registration tonnage. Another work around for firsthand 
registering a chemical would have been when a chemical was purchased from European supplier, 
then used in manufacturing, and finally imported back into Europe. This process was known as  
re-import and was REACH covered by the European company’s registration (personal 
communication, September 11, 2019). The benefit of Europe’s re-import business was an 
example of how REACH was used to help promote European businesses.     
Chemical Dossier 
“REACH regulation requires registrants to submit a registration dossier, which is 
composed of a technical dossier summarizing the results of a chemical safety assessment” 
(Karamertzanis et al., 2019, p. 303).  Some of the data required in these dossiers, apart from 
standard registrant and chemical information, included toxicological studies, thermochemical 
and (thermo)physical properties, as well as risk assessment study results (Lewis et al., 
2006).  The lack of toxicological data in particular, was one of the primary reasons for REACH 
to have sprung into existence in the first place (Karamertzanis et al., 2019). Karamertzanis et al. 
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go on to state that “approximately 40% of the registrations under REACH have been updated at 
least once after the first submission” (2019, p. 304). This has shown evidence of the European 
Chemicals Agency’s dedication to ensuring that the most current and complete chemical data 
was being used for assessing risk for both human and environmental health. 
A Chemical Safety Report was also a requirement of the registration dossier for 
chemicals 10 tonnes and over per year (Williams et al, 2009). The Chemical Safety Report 
“documents the hazards and classifications of a substance and the assessment as to whether the 
substance is carcinogenic, mutagenic, reprotoxic, persistent and bioaccumulating toxic, or very 
persistent and very bioaccumulating” (Van Hemmen, 2009, p. 562). The Chemical Safety Report 
evaluates how a substance was used by downstream users and outlined risk management steps 
that would have limited the risk that compromised their health and the environment (Williams et 
al, 2009).  
Van Hemmen (2009) stated that not only did the Chemical Safety Report address 
downstream users, but the report also considered risk management steps as to how to reduce risk 
during manufacturing. This assessment was accomplished through an exposure scenario review. 
This review was another requirement of the Chemical Safety Report.  
Van Hemmen (2009) outlined an exposure scenario’s format as follows: 
1 - Short title of the exposure scenario 
2 - Processes and activities covered 
3 - Duration and frequency of use 
4.1 - Physical form of substance or preparation; surface to volume ratio of articles 
4.2 - Concentration of substance in preparation or article 
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4.3 - Amount used per time or activity 
5 - Other relevant operation conditions of use 
6.1 - Risk management measures related to human health (specified for workers or 
consumers) 
6.2 - Risk management measures related to the environment 
7 - Waste management measures 
8 - Exposure prediction and reference to its source 
9 - Guidance to downstream user to evaluate whether work inside the boundaries set by 
the exposure scenario (p. 563).   
Cost on Industry 
The cost of REACH registration placed on the chemical industry was extremely high. 
“Various impact assessment studies undertaken on behalf of the European Commission provide 
estimates for the associated costs induced by REACH within the range of 3-5 billion Euros” 
(Lewis et al., 2006, p. 592). A registration dossier that was submitted incurred a cost of over 
€24,000 each (Benko, 2013). Lewis et al. go on to state that there were provisions put into place 
to help reduce compliance costs for smaller manufacturers. These were designed to limit the 
impact REACH would have on their finite resources. If one considered every active chemical 
company doing business in Europe, and then multiplied that number by every chemical they use 
to manufacture goods, one could see how the registration fees would have mounted quickly. The 
registration cost did not even include the cost of the studies required to meet registration.  
Some companies were forced to make difficult decisions about which products they 
would be willing to pay to register because of REACH. T. Pledger related “REACH has had a 
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significant commercial cost and poses a technical barrier in many cases. It limits the amount of 
product we can import, dependent on which tonnage band the product has been registered for. 
Though financial investment has not been the only cost incurred. The effort in manpower 
resources to get the product imported has also been significant” (personal communication, 
August 8, 2019).  R. Auerbach described one product his company chose to not register because 
it would have cost over $75,000 in registration fees and testing. The cost of registration was not 
worth gambling on potential future sales in this case (personal communication, September 11, 
2019). According to T. Pledger, some commercially available products that had been previously 
sold in Europe were sold in such small volumes that they did not justify the cost of continuing 
the business (personal communication, August 8, 2019).    
Chemical Registration 
Before December 1, 2008, a pre-registration or phase-in period was opened, which 
grouped companies that were registering the same substance (Van Hemmen, 2009). As an 
incentive for the chemical industry’s compliance, the registration fees were waived during this 
pre-registration phase (Williams et al., 2009). The effect was a success. The European Chemicals 
Agency “announced in early 2009 that over 2.2 million pre-registrations had been filed before 
the deadline, encompassing over 100,000 chemicals and 66,000 companies” (Williams et al, 
2009, p. 557). 
 In order to participate in pre-registration, manufacturers or importers must have been 
previously active in the European Union’s chemical market (Forbes, 2009). Van Hemmen (2009) 
stated that the European Chemicals Agency grouped the pre-registering companies that were 
desiring to register the same substances into groups which were known as Substance Information 
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Exchange Forums (SIEF). These SIEFs were an information exchange conduit that helped to 
limited vertebrate animal testing by eliminating multiple duplicate experiments that studied the 
same chemicals.  
The SIEFs were required to choose a Lead Registrant from each grouping. The Lead 
Registrant was ultimately in charge of preparing the final dossier for the group to the European 
Chemicals Agency. Each SIEF member was required to provide any existing findings, share the 
cost of the registration and testing, assist with data and gap analysis, and help generate additional 
data as needed (Forbes, 2009). 
Working with and sharing this much information with companies using the same 
materials could have led to competitors attempting to take advantage of another company’s data. 
As an additional protection, REACH allowed companies to use a Third-Party Representative to 
mask their identity from other members of the SIEF. The registering company would still be 
responsible for their registration duties and fees but would submit the same dossier paperwork as 
the rest of the SIEF (Forbes, 2009).  
Once all the data was collected by the SIEFs, the Lead Registrant prepared the dossier 
submission (Forbes, 2009). Forbes continued to state that the group members reviewed, 
discussed, revised and finally submitted the dossier to the European Chemicals Agency. When 
submitting the registration packet, the registrant would send the information through a secure 
portal called REACH-IT (Karamertzanis et al., 2019). Karamertzanis et al. describe this system 
as a “central IT system that supports industry, Member State Competent Authorities and the 
European Chemicals Agency to securely submit, process and manage data and dossiers” (2019, 
p. 304). 
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The Agency then reviewed the submission for the required content and examined the data 
for quality of testing. Any substance that proved to be of concern would be passed along to the 
European Union member states for review. The member states would then have used this 
information for legislation on hazard classification revisions of the substance in question. If no 
outstanding issues were present, the European Chemicals Agency approved the dossiers within a 
certain time frame and the registrant would appear on a listing of substances. This list was 
available to the public for easier evaluation of the known hazards of a product. Some information 
would be confidential and withheld from the public listing, such as composition details and 
supplier/downstream user relationships (Lahl & Hawxwell, 2006).  
As the SIEF groupings showed, emphasis was placed on the manufacturers and importers 
under this system. They were responsible for the registration of each substance and testing the 
dangers of the chemicals they supply to their downstream users (Lahl & Hawxwell, 2006). 
Registration must have been completed before companies could conduct any marketing in the 
European Union, this was also known as “no data, no market” (Filipec, 2014, p. 169). When the 
potential sales of an entire continent were threatened to be cut off, manufacturers were forced 
into compliance no matter how strongly they objected to the reforms. 
 Only Representatives 
One important business aspect of REACH was that it was focused on positioning 
European chemical manufacturers for future competitive success (Lewis et al, 2006). Forbes 
(2009) stated that the European Union manufacturers and importers under REACH were able to 
become direct registrants themselves. This lessened any trade issues within the European Union 
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member states. Forbes elaborated that any manufacturers outside of the European Union would 
not have the same privilege. 
In order to import into European Union, manufacturers were required to name an Only 
Representative. The Only Representative was a company within the European Union that would 
handle the import duties on their behalf (Forbes, 2009). Essentially, the need for an Only 
Representative created an entirely new industry in Europe. According to R. Auerbach, REACH 
was the genesis of the Only Representative business, several existing European companies were 
able to upgrade and expand their consulting and testing services to move into this line of 
business because of the legislation (personal communication, October 14, 2019).  
The Only Representative would have to agree to a non-disclosure agreement and sign a 
contract to represent a non-European Union company. The hiring company would then provide 
their product formulas to the Only Representative. These highly confidential formulas would 
have contained the composition and exact percentages of each monomer of every product 
imported to be sold. The Only Representative would then set up a database and track the import 
quantities of the product. The Only Representative would have to break down the import 
quantities to the monomer levels that are shipped into the European Union (R.  Auerbach, 
personal communication, September 11, 2019). 
The Only Representative would monitor and report the annual import levels of products 
and monomers levels. These levels would be compared versus the REACH registration tonnage 
levels for which the non-European Union company they represented had been approved. The 
Only Representative would also have compared their import data against the export records 
provided by the hiring company. Additionally, the Only Representative would have compared 
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the product purchases reported by downstream users, such as customers and distributors, to the 
registered tonnage levels for which their client had been registered (R.  Auerbach, personal 
communication, September 11, 2019). If a company exceeded their import tonnage registration, 
the European Chemicals Agency could have issued fines to the importer or even up to restricting 
a company from conducting business in the European Union ever again (R. Auerbach, personal 
communication, October 14, 2019).       
Safer Chemicals 
Through registration, REACH gathered massive amounts of new data on chemicals and 
grew their database. The European Chemicals Agency and its partner countries began “working 
more and more on groups of substances rather than individual ones” (European Chemicals 
Agency, 2018, p. 9). “Such information makes a significant contribution towards the safe use of 
chemicals given the high number of substances that are classified because of the presence of 
known hazardous constituents or impurities” (Karamertzanis et al., 2019, p. 314). They 
discovered additional information on the unknowns that only served to enhance their knowledge 
on how to classify dangerous chemicals.    
“REACH has dual aims: a high level of protection, and the enhancing of competitiveness 
and innovation” (Fischer, 2014, p. 167). One such way that REACH performed these goals was 
to promote the replacement of hazardous chemicals with safer alternatives. “Substitution 
contributes to the overarching EU objectives for a non-toxic environment and a circular 
economy, wherein innovation and sustainable production and consumption are key elements” 
(European Chemicals Agency, 2018, p. 4). 
CHEMICAL REGULATIONS AND THE EFFECT  18 
 
To help facilitate this substitution initiative, the European Chemicals Agency (2018) listed the 
following for its 2019-2023 Strategic Pan: 
• Promoting best practice examples of increased substitution of hazardous 
substances, green chemistry, and sustainability in the supply chain; 
• Promoting a mindset and behavioral change within industry towards sustainable 
and safer chemicals; 
• Collaborating with industry associations in raising awareness in developing and 
providing tools for sustainability assessments of chemical supplies (p. 5). 
 The European Chemicals Agency planned to hold numerous supply chain workshops 
with assistance from the member states of the European Union. At these workshops, the goal was 
to increase communication for more targeted substitutions on chemicals of concern or of very 
high concern. This helped suppliers focus on what research services they could provide for the 
purchasers and clarified what the purchasers were looking for from the suppliers. These 
workshops were also a valuable tool for gauging what the most pressing concerns were for 
research that may require additional government funding (European Chemicals Agency, 
2018).  These supply chain workshops were very European Union focused. This helped to pursue 
the goal of promoting the future success of the European chemical industry as world leaders in 
safe chemical substitution innovation.   
 “Sustainable substitution requires a proper understanding of the hazards and risks 
associated with the substances to be substituted and, when a chemical is substituted by another, 
of the hazards and risks of the alternatives” (European Chemicals Agency, 2018, p. 9). “REACH 
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may/will lead to many substitutions of chemicals, either forced or on a voluntary basis. In the 
end we may expect a less hazardous exposure to chemicals” (Van Hemmen, 2009, p. 568). 
Trade Influence 
“REACH not only represents a comprehensive regulatory policy framework for the 
management of chemicals in the European Union but is also compatible with World Trade 
Organization rules and directives” (Lewis et al., 2006 p. 592). Not all World Trade Organization 
countries fully agreed with the assessment of full compatibility, however the European Union 
had been dismissive of these concerns (Heyvaert, 2009). These opposing countries have pointed 
out the “unnecessary barrier to international trade” that REACH generated, particularly the ‘no 
data, no market’ rules (Forbes, 2009, p. 49).  
However, the World Trade Organization agreements have allowed for members to adopt 
rules for “protecting human, animal, or plant life and health, and the environment” that they have 
felt were necessary (Forbes, 2009, p. 49). Forbes also stated that “REACH falls within at least 
one of these provisions and, importantly, it is possible that it cannot be challenged” through the 
World Trade Organization because of the emphasis REACH placed on human and environmental 
health (2009, p. 49). 
BREXIT 
One benefit of consolidating the multiple regulations that were in place before REACH 
was the ability to have one consistent set of rules for the entire European Union. REACH had 
intended to stop the “fragmentation of the internal market” (Van Hemmen, 2009, p. 
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562).  However, the internal market has been on the verge of fragmenting with the oncoming of 
United Kingdom’s Brexit push. 
 In 1973, the United Kingdom joined the European Union (formerly known as the 
European Economic Community) and had been a willing partner for over 40 years. But the 
United Kingdom decided to leave after a referendum was held June 23, 2016. The votes were 
tallied with the results of 52-48 percent in favor of leaving. The United Kingdom will become 
the first member ever to do so.  (“Brexit: All you need…”, 2019). How both parties have handled 
this breakup has been uncharted territory and the outcome was still unclear as of October 2019. 
Several Brexit deals have been agreed upon by negotiators and leaders from both sides, 
only to be voted down by Parliament. These failed negotiations have led to the resignation of two 
Prime Ministers thus far. So, how would this affect chemical regulation? If no deal can be agreed 
upon, the plan would be to adapt the entire REACH regulation as UK REACH per the European 
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. There would be minor changes made to adopt the wording 
specific for the United Kingdom, but otherwise the whole legislation will be put in place as was 
on the date of withdraw (Health and Safety Executive, n.d.).       
 If no deal was reached, then the UK REACH and REACH “regulatory agencies would 
operate independently from each other” (Health and Safety Executive, n.d., para. 2). The Health 
and Safety Executive went on to state that this would mean that the United Kingdom and 
European Union each would be separate entities but require the same rules. All manufacturing 
and importers worldwide would be required to submit all the same registration once again to UK 
REACH.  
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If manufacturers and importers did not comply, then those companies would be cut out of 
conducting business in the United Kingdom the same manner in which they would have been in 
the European Union with the “fundamental principle of ‘no data, no market’” (Health and Safety 
Executive, n.d., para. 1). “Without a Withdrawal Agreement, the UK simply exits the EU two 
years after notice is given - this is now known as ‘no-deal’” (Smith, 2018, p. 36). Smith 
continued to state that without a deal, the United Kingdom would lose access to the over 750 
trade agreements the European Union already had in place. The governments of the United 
Kingdom and European Union were hoping for a deal as a best-case scenario. The reality would 
be that companies should have been planning contingencies for a no-deal scenario. 
However, Parliament has attempted to ease the transition as much as they could for 
United Kingdom companies in a no-deal scenario. “While qualifying registrations held by UK 
companies will be automatically transferred to the new system, the registrants will still be 
required to resubmit data” (No-deal Brexit REACH…, 2019, p. 15). “A survey of 38 UK 
companies by the Chemical Business Association (CBA) has found that 75 percent of them don’t 
own the data that would be required for them to register chemicals under UK REACH” (No-deal 
Brexit REACH…, 2019, p. 15). Many companies, domestic and abroad, have relied on data 
sharing throughout REACH registration via SIEFs or other negotiated agreements (Broadwith, 
2019). Broadwith also stated that data sharing between companies may not be as cooperative this 
time when all the registration paperwork must be re-registered. Companies that owned the 
REACH data may see a financial incentive to charge other companies for data.   
Another issue that had emerged for companies in the European Union, United Kingdom 
and the world in a no-deal scenario would be concerning Only Representatives. The 27 countries 
in the European Union constituted the United Kingdom’s “largest trading partner, representing 
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around 44.5% of UK trade goods and services in 2017” (Smith, 2018, p. 34). United Kingdom 
companies may be forced to hire an Only Representative to represent them in the European 
Union, and vice versa for European Union companies to be able to continue the large amount (of 
now international) trade with each other (Broadwith, 2019). Countries on the outside of the 
current European Union, would have to find a new Only Representative to represent their import 
business in either the United Kingdom or European Union, dependent on which area their current 
Only Representative resided.  
The entire manufacturing industry should be very concerned with the uncertainty that 
Brexit has brought to international trade. According to Smith (2018), one large company had 
estimated that Brexit may cost them between €40 to 60 million a year in extra costs. Some 
companies were just not sure what to plan for. “Large companies have already been planning for 
Brexit and have assembled teams to deal with it, but surveys show that only one in seven small 
to medium enterprises in their supply chain have started planning” (Smith, 2018, p. 39). This 
would result in a huge effect on the large companies if they could not be assured of receiving raw 
materials from portions their supply chains. 
A Managing Director that spoke on behalf of BASF, a large enterprise, expressed 
concern because of the sheer amount of chemical substances they had to register during REACH 
registration. BASF was unsure of the cost of re-registration, and they were extremely concerned 
when the unknown cost was multiplied by 1,000 registrations (No-deal Brexit REACH…, 
2019).  A European Business Development Manager for Estron Chemical, a small to medium 
sized enterprise, expressed concern as well when it came to be time to register new products. For 
each new product brought to market, the registration costs would be double what they have been 
previously (T. Pledger, personal communication, August 8, 2019). “The call from industry is that 
CHEMICAL REGULATIONS AND THE EFFECT  23 
 
the best outcome would be for the UK to remain within the jurisdiction of REACH, and 
somehow associated with the European Chemicals Agency that oversees it” (Broadwith, 2019, 
para. 7).   
The uncertainty that surrounded the possible no-deal scenario could be alleviated with an 
actual deal that was approved by both the European Union and the United Kingdom's Parliament. 
A potential new deal was agreed upon between Boris Johnson, Prime Minister for the United 
Kingdom, and Jean-Claude Juncker, European Union Commission President, on October 17, 
2019. Johnson had threatened to leave the European Union on October 31, 2019 with or without 
a deal. In response, Parliament had responded by passing a law that made a negotiated extension 
request a requirement if no deal was in place by October 19, 2019 (Smith, 2019).   
United States Chemical Regulatory Systems 
Federal government regulations over certain types of chemicals have dated back to 1906. 
This first regulation that concerned business transactions between states affected the 
“misbranded and adulterated foods, drinks and drugs” (Krimsky, 2017, p. 2). According to 
Krimsky, after 107 people were killed by a contaminated batch of Elixir Sulfanilamide, the 
Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act was passed through Congress. This law ensured that drug 
manufacturers were responsible for proving that their products were safe for use before they 
could be sold to consumers.  
Industrial chemical manufacturing had a major increase in production as World War II 
was ending. The area of chemical commerce was still unregulated, as it did not fall under any of 
the previous laws enacted in the United States. The federal government took a hands-off 
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approach during this post-war boom and refrained from acting unless public health was at risk 
(Krimsky, 2017). However, their time for inaction was rapidly drawing to a close. 
As explained by the United States Environmental Protection Agency, “the American 
conversation about protecting the environment began in the 1960s” (2018, para. 1). The book 
Silent Spring was released, which addressed the overuse of pesticides. Then an oil rig off 
California’s coast spilled millions of gallons of oil, which contaminated the water and beaches. 
And finally, the Cuyahoga River running past Cleveland, Ohio once again caught on fire, fueled 
by the water’s chemical contamination (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2018).  
Because of these reasons, in addition to more instances of industrial negligence, the 
American public was growing restless for government intervention. President Richard Nixon 
seized on the public support and led the way (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
2018). President Nixon formed the President’s Council on Environmental Quality, which 
produced the 1971 report called Toxic Substances (Eichenberger, 2015).  The committee’s report 
on the risks toxic chemicals had found: “(1) toxic substances were entering the environment; (2) 
the effects of these substances were largely unknown and potentially severe; (3) existing legal 
mechanisms were not suited to address these effects; and (4) new legal authority was required” 
(Eichenberger, 2015, pp. 125-126). The council’s recommendations on proposed legal authority 
were drawn up, sent to Congress and recommend the creation of a new federal agency. (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, 2018). 
According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (2018), these 
recommendations included:    
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• The EPA would have the capacity to do research on important pollutants irrespective of 
the media in which they appear, and on the impact of these pollutants on the total 
environment. 
• Both by itself and together with other agencies, the EPA would monitor the condition of 
the environment - biological as well as physical. 
• With this data, the EPA would be able to establish quantitative “environmental baselines” 
- critical for efforts to measure adequately the success or failure of pollution abatement 
efforts.  
• The EPA would be able - in concert with the states - to set and enforce standards for air 
and water quality and for individual pollutants. 
• Industries seeking to minimize the adverse impact of their activities on the environment 
would be assured of consistent standards covering the full range of their waste disposal 
systems.  
• As states developed and expanded their own pollution control programs, they would be 
able to look to one agency to support their efforts with financial and technical assistance 
and training (para 4.)  
TSCA Implementation 
The need for oversight on the chemical manufacturing industry was becoming 
increasingly clear. As the public outcry grew louder, there was “a realization that the chemical 
industry was not effectively policing itself in the absence of effective regulation” (Eichenberger, 
2015, p. 126). Eichenberger stated that witnesses came forward to Congressional committees and 
testified “that certain chemical manufacturers and processors knew about the carcinogenic 
effects of chemicals used in the processes, but intentionally withheld the information from the 
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public, their employees and the government in an effort to avoid liability and regulation” (2015, 
p. 126).  
According to Eichenberger (2015), Congress intended to put the burden of any regulatory 
compliance and chemical hazards directly on the chemical industry in the form of required 
information. The industry would be forced to share the information they already knew and 
address the gaps about what they did not know. While their intentions to address the public’s 
safety was noble, the final product that emerged was influenced by the chemical industry. 
Ultimately “Congress sought to balance concerns over toxic exposure and our information deficit 
with assurance that our burgeoning chemical industry would maintain its ability to operate and 
innovate” (Eichenberger, 2015, p. 127). 
“Although both the Senate and House of Representatives agreed that the proposal should 
be enacted as law, the two houses could not come to a consensus on the exact language of the 
provisions” (Behnke, 2017, p. 461). But the Congressional disagreements were soon to be 
resolved. “In 1976, the urgency of passing the bill received an unanticipated and tragic increase 
due to an outbreak of severe neurological disorders in workers at a company that manufactured 
pesticides” (Eichenberger, 2015, p. 127). Eichenberger continued to state that as the national 
news picked up on the story, the increased coverage put additional pressure on Congress to 
finally act.  
Congressional action took the form of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). After 
these events, chemical regulation in the United States was finally born. The need for the bill was 
justified based on President Nixon’s committee recommendations and had the legal backing of 
the clause in the United States Constitution that charges the government with the responsibility 
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to ensure the general welfare of the country’s citizens (Krimsky, 2017). Behnke reported that 
“President Ford signed TSCA into law on October 11, 1976” (2017, p. 461).  
TSCA’s Content 
When TSCA was enacted, the EPA was placed in charge of the enforcement of the laws 
governing manufacturing and the chemicals used by the industry (Behnke, 2017). According to 
Eichenberger (2015), the original structure of TSCA was limited to one section, also known as 
Title I. Under Title I, the EPA was “authorized to gather information, regulate chemical 
substances, and disseminate the information it collects to interested parties” (Eichenberger, 2015, 
p. 127).  
 One example of gathering information was that the EPA compiled a list of all chemicals 
in use at the time. When the list was compiled, it reached over 62,000 chemicals. These 
chemicals were immediately considered grandfathered and safe to use commercially, unless they 
were eventually proven as unsafe. (Krimsky, 2017). 
Another method under which the EPA could gather information was through cooperation with a 
chemical’s manufacturer, Eichenberger stated that the EPA could:  
Require manufacturer testing of existing chemicals under certain circumstances, require 
pre-market screening and regulatory tracking for new chemicals, control unreasonable 
risks through regulation, gather information about production, use, and adverse effects of 
existing chemicals, and protect certain business information it receives. (2015, pp. 127-
128) 
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 As maintained by Behnke (2017), even with the ability to require testing, TSCA 
legislation came up short with respect to information sharing. Manufacturers did not have to 
“disclose the hazardous traits of chemicals to the public, private, or government entities that used 
these substances” (Behnke, 2017, p. 462). This shortcoming would eventually become one of the 
major failings of TSCA. 
  When a chemical was found to be a danger to either to health or to the environment, then 
the EPA was allowed to issue rules to regulate the chemical. Some of options for an issued rule 
could range from a notice to distributors on the chemical hazards, all the way up to a total ban on 
a chemical. However, there were certain considerations the EPA had to address before they could 
regulate a chemical through these rules (Eichenberger, 2015).  
As stated by Krimsky, for the EPA to regulate a chemical:  
In addition, under the act, EPA had to demonstrate that the benefits of regulation a 
chemical were greater than the costs – to the manufacturer, to companies utilizing the 
chemical, and to the economy – and that its regulation offered greater benefit than the 
social value of the products it was used to create. (2017, p. 3) 
 When a chemical was to be regulated, a new rule would be issued. This was a lengthy 
process that could take at least three to five years. Due to the difficult nature, costs and time 
involved with issuing a rule, the EPA found that negotiating voluntary agreements with chemical 
manufacturers was far easier, cheaper and faster (Eichenberger, 2015).   
As the EPA collected data from manufacturers and testing, there were certain rules in 
place under TSCA that restricted with whom they could share those findings. Companies could 
CHEMICAL REGULATIONS AND THE EFFECT  29 
 
claim to the EPA that the data they provided was confidential and not to be shared. When a 
confidentiality claim was made, the information was protected. If the information was leaked or 
disclosed, the offending party could have been fined and imprisoned (Eichenberger, 2015).  
Banning Asbestos 
According to Behnke (2017), the wording of the TSCA legislation allowed for many 
loopholes and exclusions that chemical manufacturers could exploit and defeat the EPA’s 
rulings. The “EPA could, in theory, take an existing chemical off the market but it would have to 
meet a formidable burden, namely produce substantial evidence that the chemical presents or 
will present an unreasonable risk to health and the environment” (Krimsky, 2017, p. 3). Behnke 
goes on to state that TSCA “put the government in a position in which it lacked the legal tools it 
needed to prevent or substantially limit possible environmental and health hazards” (2017, p. 
461). One example of TSCA’s failure was the EPA’s attempt to ban asbestos, which had been 
proven to be a known carcinogen (Rosner & Markowitz, 2017).  
“By 1970, asbestos was used in some 3,000 products, such as roof shingles, floor tiles, 
house siding, ironing boards, and particularly in brakes, among other consumer items” (Rosner & 
Markowitz, 2017, p. 1395). According to Rosner and Markowitz, asbestos was still able to be 
used in brakes and construction materials even in current times. The material can still be found in 
homes and businesses anywhere in the United States.   
Rosner and Markowitz (2017) state that as far back as the 1930s, asbestos was suspected 
of being dangerous to workers. When materials that contained asbestos were cut or ground down, 
it was noted that the dust produced would slowly strangle the workers. Around 30 years later, 
asbestos was suspected as being a cause of the lung cancer, mesothelioma. The British Ford 
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Motor Company held “conference in 1969 on the possible dangers presented to brake mechanics 
and those installing or replacing brake linings” (Rosner & Markowitz, 2017, p. 1395).   
Committees were established by industry to look at the effects. Some examples of these 
committees were the Asbestos Study Committee and the Asbestos Information Association of 
North America. These committees were aware and accepted that asbestos was a danger to 
workers who were handling items such as brakes. These industrial committees also understood 
why the government was issuing new regulations to protect workers, even if they were not in 
complete agreement (Rosner & Markowitz, 2017).  
One such regulation was that companies must warn their employees of the dangers 
asbestos posed to them. After this regulation was issued, the brake industry decided they would 
not warn  their workers. The industry executives acted in defiance instead. “They publicly 
pronounced that asbestos, when ‘locked in’ to fabrics, lacquers, plastics or other finished 
products, was not a danger as it could not be released into the air” (Rosner & Markowitz, 2017, 
p. 1396). The committee members did privately acknowledge that brakes functioned through 
friction, and used brakes exposed workers. Warnings were again considered, but ultimately 
disregarded because of the damage it would have brought to their products (Rosner & 
Markowitz, 2017). 
More and more studies were released over the next few years that linked asbestos to 
cancer. In light of these, the government, OSHA in particular, attempted to regulate the amount 
of asbestos fibers that could be free in the air. In 1975, the plan was to reduce the regulation from 
5 fibers/cc to 2 fibers/cc. There was a push to reduce the regulation further to 0 fibers/cc, as that 
would be the only truly safe level of exposure. The industry called the 2 fibers/cc limit 
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impossible to meet by the deadline that was in place. Additionally, the industry definitely could 
not ever meet a zero-level threshold. A year later, OSHA altered the recommendation to push the 
limit to 0.5 fibers/cc. The industry opposed yet again, and the standard held at 2 fibers/cc till the 
1980’s (Rosner & Markowitz, 2017).  
The industry was well aware of the effects of using asbestos and the toll it was having on 
their employees. Eventually industry executives agreed to post warning signs in auto workshops 
and garages, but would not use the wording the government suggested, which mentioned 
asbestosis and cancer. Instead, they posted that asbestos might be hazardous to a person’s health 
(Rosner & Markowitz, 2017).  
Eventually the EPA took over the fight from OSHA and outright banned asbestos in the 
United States. The ban was challenged in the judicial system and eventually came to a head in 
the case of Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA that was heard in the 5th Circuit of the United States 
Federal Court of Appeals. The court ruled against and overturned “the EPA regulation that 
banned asbestos products on a number of grounds, including that the EPA had failed to give 
adequate weight to statutory language requiring it to promulgate the least burdensome, 
reasonable regulation required to protect the environment adequately” (Fisher, 2014, pp. 166-
167). Behnke (2017) stated that the main factor that went against the EPA in the case was the 
‘least burdensome’ statement in TSCA. In this case, the court ruled that least burdensome meant 
the EPA had to consider the cost on industry and evaluate if there was another way to regulate 
asbestos rather than an outright ban. After this ruling went against the EPA, their perceived 
power was significantly damaged. “The EPA did not attempt to regulate any other existing 
chemicals under TSCA” (Behnke, 2017, p. 461).  
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Premanufacturing Notification 
The EPA was left near powerless to regulate existing chemicals after losing the asbestos 
court battle. But regulating new chemicals which were being introduced into the market, and not 
previously listed on TSCA’s chemical inventory, was covered by a whole different set of 
undamaged rules (Krimsky, 2017). DeVito and Farris (1997) state that this review process began 
in 1979. According to Eichenberger, “TSCA’s premanufacture notification requirement has been 
reasonably successful at requiring companies to notify the EPA when a new chemical is 
manufactured or an existing chemical is put to a new use” (2015, p. 134).  
When a chemical company designed a new product and a customer became interested 
after evaluating experimental samples, the chemical company was not allowed to make the 
product on an industrial scale right away. The manufacturer was required to first notify the EPA 
of their intentions to produce a new chemical. This notification was called a premanufacturing 
notice (Krimsky, 2017). 
Eichenberger (2015) stated that once the EPA was notified, they had 90 days to review 
the premanufacturing data submitted by the manufacturer. Eichenberger also stated that the 
notice “shall include health, safety and test data, the manufacturer is only required to provide 
what is known to them or reasonably ascertainable” (2015, p. 135). “There were no penalties 
associated with lack of data” (Krimsky, 2017, p. 4).  
R. Auerbach stated that when filing a premanufacturing notification, quite a lot of 
information could be part of the submission if the manufacturer wished (personal 
communication, October 6, 2019). R. Auerbach offered some examples of EPA requested 
information such as composition, structure, residual monomers, manufacturing process, 
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treatment of waste, employee and end user exposure, spectral data, and any available toxicity 
data.  But only some information was required by TSCA and the rest was voluntarily provided 
by manufacturer, if they desired.  
“In general, these notifications contain no testing data and only an estimated fifteen 
percent contain any health and safety information” (Eichenberger, 2015, p. 135). Krimsky (2017) 
reported that as of 2003, 85 percent of the premanufacturing notifications submitted to the EPA 
did not contain data concerning human health. Eichenberger goes on to state that this created a 
system that rewarded chemical companies to know very little about the products that they were 
attempting to take to market. While the more responsible companies that generated the proper 
amount of test data for the EPA would be at a regulatory disadvantage.      
DeVito and Farris (1997) summarize the EPA’s approval process: 
The PMN Review Process consists of four distinct, successive technical phases: the 
chemistry review phase, the hazard (toxicity) evaluation phase, the exposure evaluation 
phase and the risk assessment/risk management phase. These phases are structured to 
“drop” substances of low-risk from review and to focus more sharply on, and explore 
more deeply, those substances of greater risk as the review progresses.  
Certain types of polymers could have been an example of a drop substance. The EPA 
established that these polymers were not suspected of being dangerous to the environment or to 
humans. Certain criteria was required to be met by these polymers in order to qualify to be 
dropped from review. Some examples of these requirements were the type of polymer, measured 
oligomer levels below certain thresholds (10% <500 Daltons and 25% <1,000 Daltons), and that 
the polymer could not swell when exposed to water. These were just a few of the rules that 
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applied for drop requirements, although the 90 day wait period was still enforced even if the 
application was dropped from review (DeVito & Farris, 1997).  
Eichenberger (2015) stated that the EPA could extend the 90-day window due to limited 
data. DeVito and Farris (1997) state that the window for extension could only be a maximum of 
180 days. However, Eichenberger stated that the criteria for extensions were typically hard to 
justify. If the EPA wanted to delay a premanufacturing notice “which they feel lacks sufficient 
health and safety information, the agency has the burden to show that the manufacture, 
processing, or distribution of the chemical may present an unreasonable risk or will result in 
substantial exposure” (Eichenberger, 2015, p. 135).  
R. Auerbach related that of all the premanufacturing notices that he had been a part of, 
only once had the EPA requested additional information that would have delayed the 90-day 
window (personal communication, October 6, 2019). R. Auerbach stated that the test data the 
EPA had requested was additional toxicity data, which would have cost his company 
approximately $100,000 to pay for the testing. Ultimately, the premanufacturing notification was 
withdrawn.        
“On average the EPA receives between 600 and 2,000 premanufacture notifications per 
calendar year” (Eichenberger, 2015, p. 135). With all the new chemicals that entered the market 
through the premanufacturing notifications, it was expected that there would be “approximately 
85,000 chemicals on the TSCA inventory by 2017” (Krimsky, 2017, p. 4). However, according 
to Eichenberger, the EPA’s chemical inventory was viewed as flawed and not correct. Chemicals 
that were no longer manufactured were supposed to be removed from the list. But chemical 
manufacturers were not required by TSCA to report to the EPA if they had discontinued making 
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products. And so, most do not bother with notifying the EPA. “Current industry estimates place 
the actual number of chemicals in commerce at about 25,000” (Eichenberger, 2015, p. 136).   
The combination of such a short amount of time for review and the overwhelming 
amount of new chemicals applications submitting to enter the market was not a recipe for 
success. “Lack of agency resources and inability to move quickly makes it nearly impossible for 
the EPA to conduct an adequate premarket review based on the notification” (Eichenberger, 
2015, p. 135). In short, the EPA’s regulation of new chemicals under the limitations of TSCA 
was set up for failure from the very beginning. 
State Preemption 
 Under the original TSCA, states were authorized to develop their own legislation to 
govern the use of chemicals inside their borders. These laws were required to go above and 
beyond the federal regulations in place from Congress and the EPA. In this case, the federal laws 
were essentially a minimum set of regulations. For example, no state could pass laws to have 
laws that were less stringent than federal regulation to attract industry interest. However, if a 
federal law was in conflict with the state’s law, the federal law would always preempt the state 
through the Supremacy Clause in the United States Constitution (Behnke, 2017). 
 According to Behnke, “numerous states have spent a decade or more developing their 
own regulatory systems on chemical substances. Over time, several states- including California, 
Washington, Maine, Maryland, and Minnesota – have become leaders on executing increasingly 
stringent laws” (2017, p. 473). The unquestioned regulatory leader amongst these states was 
California with their 1986 legislation named Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act or 
as the chemical industry knew it, Proposition 65 (Lovett, 1997). 
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 Proposition 65 “requires businesses to publish warnings when exposing consumers to 
significant amounts of chemicals identified by the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity” 
(Lovett, 1997, p. 368). Lovett reported that Proposition 65 placed the responsibility of regulatory 
labeling onto the manufacturer. The Californian government was only responsible for assembling 
the list of chemicals which were suspected to be cancer causing or posed reproductive hazards.    
 The effects of Proposition 65 have led to positive effects in California through the threat 
of economic loss. As explained by Lovett (1997), sales have been severely affected by the 
required warning of birth defects and cancer on product labels. “Even the threat of having to give 
Proposition 65 warnings can prompt immediate reformulation of a product” (Lovett, 1997, p. 
369).   
Lovett listed some examples of these product formula changes: 
• Eliminating trichloroethylene from typewriters correction fluid; 
• The discovery that lead was leaching into wine from foil caps, spurring the now-universal 
use of plastic or aluminum caps; and 
• A series of failure-to-warn cases in the mid-1990s that caused industry to redesign 
plumbing fixtures and water pumps so that lead would not be leached into the water 
through brass parts (1997, p. 369).  
Lautenberg Reform 
In Charleston, West Virginia on January 9, 2014, a bulk tank filled with 4-
methylcyclohexane methanol (MCHM) had leaked. The 10,000-gallon spill flowed into a nearby 
river that was the main supply of drinking water for 300,000 people. The properties and health 
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effects of MCHM were incomplete at best. The people of the area were still using bottled water 
for drinking, bathing and cooking for months after the incident. Public outrage pushed for 
renewed calls for chemical reform following the spill (Eichenberger, 2015).   
 According to Krimsky (2017), an example of TSCA’s failings was that under the original 
TSCA, the EPA had to ensure that in eliminating chemicals they had chosen the least 
burdensome process to achieve their goal. The wording of least burdensome had caused the 
judicial system to rule against the EPA as was seen in the attempt to ban asbestos. As a result, 
“since 1976, the EPA has used its authority under TSCA to limit or ban only 5 existing 
chemicals: fully halogenated chlorofluororoalkanes, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), dioxin, 
asbestos (later overturned by the courts), and hexavalent chromium” (Krimsky, 2017, p.4). 
The manufacturing industry and environmental groups both added themselves to the 
growing list of those eager for TSCA reform. The chemical industry was looking to increase the 
public’s confidence after years of decreasing trust, open avenues for increased innovative ideas, 
and establish uniform nationwide regulations, rather than differing rules state to state. 
Environmental groups were pushing for regulation that was more effective in the judicial system 
and reduce the ever-increasing number of hazardous chemicals and their effect on environmental 
and human health (Eichenberger, 2015).  
As TSCA continued to flounder, Senator Frank Lautenberg, a Democrat from the state of 
New Jersey, stepped up to become a champion for chemical safety reform. According to Plautz 
and National Journal (2015), Lautenberg had earlier in his career led bills through the Senate to 
stop airlines from allowing smoking on planes and to toughen punishment for drunk drivers. But 
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his dream was to cap off his legacy by shepherding legislation on chemical safety reform through 
Congress. 
Guc (2018) stated that Lautenberg introduced the Kid Safe Chemicals Act of 2005 to 
indicate the need for regulation reform. He never expected this bill to pass though. In 2010, 
Lautenberg introduced the Safe Chemicals Act of 2010 and then updated, refined and 
reintroduced the Safe Chemicals Act of 2011. Neither bill made any progress through the Senate 
(Filipec, 2014).  
In 2013, Lautenberg partnered with two very different Senators on chemical reform bills. 
The Safe Chemical Act of 2013 was co-sponsored with Senator Kristen Gillibrand, and 
ultimately met the same fate as the previous versions of the bill (Filipec, 2014). Per Plautz and 
National Journal (2015), Lautenberg then invited Senator Joe Manchin to co-sponsor another 
reform legislation attempt, but Manchin declined. Instead Manchin encouraged Lautenberg to 
meet with Senator David Vitter. Vitter was a Republican from Louisiana and the two had never 
really worked together before.  
Vitter had been working on a competing reform bill that would have been more industry 
friendly than Lautenberg’s. The two Senators sat down, got to know each other, and agreed they 
could work together. They merged their bills, each removed certain aspects the other disliked. 
And shortly after, a bipartisan bill was introduced to Congress by the unlikely pair. The 
bipartisan effort initially scared off some of each Senator’s previous supporters due to 
widespread distrust of the other party (Plautz & National Journal, 2015). 
Then, “just six weeks after the bill came out, Lautenberg passed away at age 89” (Plautz 
& National Journal, 2015, para. 13). Plautz and National Journal stated that despite the death of 
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his across-the-aisle partner, Vitter continued to press their bill after receiving the encouragement 
of Lautenberg’s widow. Vitter sought out a new Democratic partner in Tom Udall from New 
Mexico. The two decided to make some changes including renaming the bill after their fallen 
comrade, grandfathering several state laws, and adding more provisions protecting populations 
most vulnerable to the effects of chemical toxicity, such as elderly, children, and pregnant 
women. 
According to Plautz and National Journal (2015), Vitter and Udall worked their way 
through the Senate looking for co-sponsors. Plautz and National Journal stated that the goal was 
to reach 60 senators to avoid the Senatorial tactic of blocking a bill known as a filibuster. 
Another goal was to keep the co-sponsor count as a one-for-one deal, to truly be bipartisan. 
When they signed on a Republican co-sponsor, they made sure to also find another Democrat 
sponsor. The bill was ultimately passed and delivered to the Oval Office. “On June 22, 2016, 
President Barack Obama signed the ‘Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century 
Act’ into law” (Behnke, 2017, p. 464). 
The New Lautenberg TSCA 
 The Lautenberg Act increased the authority of the EPA to enforce the regulatory laws 
that had long been ignored. The EPA was now allowed to require information from 
manufacturers. This data had previously been only rarely provided to the EPA on a voluntary 
basis (Krimsky, 2017).  
Guc (2018) described the EPA’s testing ability as such: 
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EPA no longer must compel testing through rule promulgation. Instead, EPA may require 
testing through an order or consent agreement, and even then, EPA can require testing 
merely for the purposes of developing more information about the chemical in question, 
or its manufacturing process or role in commerce. (p. 470) 
According to Krimsky (2017), the EPA was now able to judge if an unreasonable risk to 
health existed from a chemical. Krimsky continued to state that if a chemical did pose such a 
risk, then the EPA would no longer subject to their biggest loophole. The least burdensome 
method of regulation was mercifully eliminated, which as was seen in the asbestos case, usually 
fell back to a cost – benefit analysis. 
Although certain state chemical programs were grandfathered, such as California’s Prop 
65, the federal government established a much more dominate role in the regulation of 
chemicals. Behnke (2017) stated that “if the EPA has determined a chemical does not pose an 
unreasonable risk, then the states cannot enact new legislation or continue to enforce previous 
legislation” (p. 467). Krimsky (2017) reported that any regulations a state had in place on a 
chemical would be preempted if the EPA was conducting a safety assessment.   
“In an effort to triage what has become a forty-year backlog of chemicals that need 
testing, the new TSCA mandated a prioritization scheme which had to be developed within a 
year of the Act’s enactment” (Guc, 2018, p. 471). Guc continued to describe the prioritization of 
chemicals, which was broken down in two categories; high-priority and low-priority. Ten of the 
chemicals designated as high-priority for risk evaluations were required to be pulled from an 
official document named TSCA Work Plan for Chemical Assessments. 
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The high-priority list was required to be composed of 20 chemicals, plus an additional 20 
placed on the low-priority list (Guc, 2018). Guc continued to state that after one of the 20 high-
priority chemicals had completed its safety assessment, then a new chemical must be added to 
the high-priority list. According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (2019a), 
with the known data that had existed on a chemical, certain criteria would have to be reviewed 
each time before an addition could be made to the high-priority list: 
• The hazard and exposure potential of the chemical substance; 
• Persistence and bioaccumulation;  
• Potentially exposed or susceptible subpopulations; 
• Storage near significant sources of drinking water; 
• The conditions of use or significant changes in the conditions of use of the chemical 
substance; and  
• The volume or significant changes in the volume of the chemical substance manufactured 
or processed (para. 4). 
Once a chemical has been labeled as high-priority, it would undergo a risk evaluation. 
The risk evaluation examined how the chemicals were used, who was exposed, and any hazards 
the material presented to humans and the environment. The EPA would have to assess the likely 
exposure routes a chemical presented. The EPA would also be required to list all hazards that the 
chemical may cause, such as cancer, neurological issues, or mutations. After these steps were 
complete, a risk determination would identify if the chemical posed an unreasonable risk. If the 
chemical was a hazard, then it would be subject to additional risk management steps (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, 2019b).  
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The first 10 chemicals selected in December 2016 by the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency for risk evaluations were: 
• Asbestos 
• 1-Bromopropane 
• Carbon Tetrachloride 
• 1,4 Dioxane 
• Cyclic Aliphatic Bromide Cluster (HBCD) 
• Methylene Chloride 
• N-Methylpyrrolidone 
• Perchloroethylene 
• Pigment Violet 29 
• Trichloroethylene (2019b, para. 23). 
When a company decided to manufacture a new chemical under the old TSCA, all the 
company was required to do was wait 90 days after notifying the EPA. Under the Lautenberg 
TSCA, an acknowledgment from the EPA was now required that stated that they believe the 
chemical posed no unreasonable risk. The EPA also updated its new chemical notification 
system, which was now handled through submission of registration data through a manufacturer 
specific secure portal (R. Auerbach, personal communication, September 11, 2019).  
New and existing chemicals that would require testing were now subject to fees to be 
paid by the applying manufacturer. The fees that were collected were now deposited into a 
TSCA specific fund that supported regulatory compliance efforts. This fund had not existed 
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under the original TSCA. Previously, any fees that were collected had gone directly into the 
United States Treasury general fund (Guc, 2018). 
Polymer Exemption 
One exception to new chemical registration was to be qualified for polymer exemption. 
In accordance with the United States Environmental Protection Agency (2017), polymer 
exemptions were “to encourage the manufacture of safer polymers by reducing industry’s 
reporting burden for this category of chemical substances and concentrate the Agency’s review 
resources on substances expected to pose higher risk” (para. 1). The United States Environmental 
Protection Agency stated that any polymer that met the exemption rules was allowed to be 
manufactured without filing of a premanufacturing notification.  
The manufacturer of a polymer-exempt material would be required to retain records that 
were subject to inspection by the EPA. Reports were also required to be submitted annually by 
January 31st on the pounds produced and number of polymer exempt materials that were 
manufactured or distributed. This method was expected to free up EPA resources to be able to 
focus on higher risk chemicals (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). 
Criteria for exemptions include:  
• Polymers with molecular weight (MW) of 1,000 Daltons or greater and less than 10,000 
Daltons are eligible, with restrictions on low MW species and reactive functional groups; 
• Polymers with MW of 10,000 Daltons or greater, with restrictions on low MW species 
(United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2017, para. 5). 
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The list of allowable elements has been expanded to include chlorine, bromine, iodine as 
monatomic counterions; and fluorine, chlorine, bromine and iodine if covalently bound to 
carbon; biopolymer which meet the polymer definition are no longer excluded; polymers that 
are cationic or anticipated to become cationic in aquatic environments are now eligible for 
exemption if the polymer is solid, not soluble or dispersible in water and will be used only in 
solid phase, or equivalent weight is equal or greater than 5,000; and there is an expanded list 
of specified reactants for polyesters. (United States Environmental Agency, 2017, para. 6) 
There were exclusions that prevented some polymers from being listed as polymer exempt. 
Polymers that break down or decompose were not eligible. All raw materials that were included 
in the synthesis of a polymer must be included on TSCA’s chemical inventory list. If a polymer 
absorbed water, then it was also prevented from being listed as polymer exempt (United States 
Environmental Agency, 2017).  
Non-Compliance with TSCA 
Under the new TSCA, the punishments for non-compliance could be severe. For 
example, if a company was discovered to be selling a non-TSCA listed or a non-polymer 
exempted product in the United States, the monetary fines would be severe. The offending 
company’s regulatory specialist and ownership would be held as the responsible parties and 
could be subject to possible imprisonment (R. Auerbach, personal communication, September 
11, 2019).   
State of Lautenberg’s TSCA  
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The new legislation has had a great effect by expanding the EPA’s authority and restored 
their presence in the chemical regulatory world. But criticism still existed from environmental 
and the industry. On one hand, some think the legislation was not enough and tramples state’s 
rights to self regulate and enforce stricter laws. As previously stated, a state cannot legally pass a 
law that goes beyond the federal law, barring a judicial challenge (Behnke, 2017). But, on the 
other side of the argument, the Lautenberg reform had gone too far. Some feel that the EPA had 
been given too much authority and was using it to overregulate. That side has been fighting 
overregulation by attempting to reduce the EPA’s financial resources. 
Effects of Changing Administrations on TSCA 
The push to regulate and limit industrial damage to the environment was first put into law 
on January 1, 1970. The first of many laws to come was the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), which was approved by President Nixon (Pelley, 2008).  “The idea behind the NEPA, 
also known as the Magna Carta of U.S. environmental policy, is simple: federal agencies should 
evaluate and disclose the environmental impacts of major projects before they are launched” 
(Pelley, 2008, p. 7).  
Since Nixon’s administration there have been eight administrations to hold the office of 
President of the United States. Those administrations have had vastly different beliefs, be it 
personal or through outside influence, on how the Environmental Protection Agency should be 
ran. “Wealthy donors, think tanks, and fossil fuel and chemical industries have become more 
influential in fighting regulation. In the broader public, political polarization has increased, the 
environment has become a partisan issue, and science and the mainstream media are distrusted” 
(Fredrickson et al., 2018, p. 96).  
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During the Nixon administration, the Environmental Protection Agency was created and 
the Clear Air (1970) and Clean Water Acts (1972) were signed into law (Fredrickson et al, 
2018). And in 1976, with President Ford’s signature, the Toxic Substances Control Act became 
law (Guc, 2018).  It wasn’t until the 1980’s that the environmental policies of the previous 
decade were first threatened.  
“Reagan abandoned the practice of previous administrations of appointing agency heads 
with federal government experience and sympathy for the agency’s mission. Instead he chose 
people from industry who shared his anti-regulatory views” (Fredrickson et al, 2018, p. 96). 
According to Fredrickson et al., Anne Gorsuch was named Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency. Gorsuch had been a harsh critic and vocal opponent against the Clean Air 
Act and other environmentally friendly regulations. Gorsuch slashed the EPA’s staff by 21 
percent and cut civil cases against industry by 75 percent in her first two years on the job. Under 
Gorsuch’s watch the agency “resisted classifying formaldehyde as a human carcinogen,” 
“neglected to warn about dioxin levels in the Great Lakes fish” and was slow “on a clean-up of 
heavily leaded soil around a Dallas, Texas smelter” (Fredrickson et al, 2018, p. 97).  
Gorsuch was eventually forced out of office mainly due to leaks from within the EPA 
that highlighted the neglect her department had fostered. Reagan, under public pressure re-
appointed William Ruckelshaus, the Agency’s first administration to the post. For the remainder 
of Reagan’s Administration, Ruckelshaus ran the department with transparency and 
independently from politics (Fredrickson et al., 2018). 
The next time the Environmental Protection Agency was threatened came during the 
administration of President George W. Bush. The threats were not as overt, but relied “on 
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delaying decisions and undermining science, rather than cutting budgets” (Frederickson et al., 
2018, p. 98).  According to Pelley, under the Bush 43 administration, the NEPA was sidestepped 
as needed. A portion of border fence that was to be constructed would run through “the San 
Pedro Riparian National Conservation Area in Arizona, plugging up season streams and wildlife 
corridors” (Pelley, 2008, p. 7). Because the environmental impact studies were skipped, these 
side effect of blocked streams and wildlife migration were not anticipated.  
Pelley (2008) related that other laws that were passed during the Bush 43 years that 
attempted to ignore the environmental impact studies.  These studies were required through the 
NEPA and could take up to three and a half years to complete, or essentially a Presidential term. 
The Bush 43 administration was after seeking results.  
The harshest Presidential administration that has affected the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s mission thus far has been Donald Trump’s. A traditional Republican administration 
would typically attempt to encourage a healthy economy through less government intervention in 
private commerce. However, Trump’s administration has hardly been a traditional 
administration. The current mission has seemed to be to undo the previous administration’s 
environmental efforts en masse, with or without cause or consideration for the long-term damage 
caused to the planet, wildlife, or even the human race. “Trump has made eliminating federal 
regulations a priority” (Popovich, Albeck-Ripka & Pierre-Louis, 2019, para. 1). According to 
Popovich et al., the Trump administration has targeted over 80 regulations to scale back or 
eliminate all together.   
Fredrickson et al. (2018) stated that Scott Pruitt, who made his reputation on being a 
hostile opponent of the Environmental Protection Agency, was appointed to be Trump’s first 
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Administrator. In 2018, the proposed budget for the Agency was to be cut by 31 percent, a higher 
percentage than Reagan ever achieved. The Administration has “removed or obscured 
information about climate change from web sites, dismissed scientific advisory panels” and 
blocked scientific grants given out by the Agency (Fredrickson et al., 2018, p. 100).  
After several controversies, Pruitt moved on, but the mission remained to be the same. A 
former coal lobbyist, Andrew Wheeler was next to take over as Acting Administrator (Trump 
administration…, 2019). Under Wheeler, one standard the Agency was attempting to roll back 
was the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) which came into effect in 2012 and 
primarily affected coal plants. The MATS legislation “required plants to reduce mercury and 
other pollutants by over 90% in five years and since the rule was created, mercury emissions 
have dropped by 80-90%” (Trump administration…, 2019, p. 16). Inside the utilities industry, 
not everyone was on board with rolling back the standard.  
The majority of utilities companies have already made the changes required by MATS by 
investing in equipment such as scrubbers. An open letter by trade groups and unions to 
the EPA in July 2018 stated that any change in the rules would be of no benefit because 
they have already spent an estimated US $18bn to comply since 2012. (Trump 
administration…, 2019, p. 17)      
 The utilities companies were not the only ones opposed to deregulation. “More than 20 
states are suing the Trump administration over its rollback of climate-change regulations for 
power plants in what could be a landmark case deciding what the federal government’s 
responsibility is for fighting global warming” (Puko, 2019, para. 1). Puko stated that the states 
were accusing the federal government of abandoning the Clean Air Act. The Trump 
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administration had stopped enforcing the Obama era Clean Power Plan and replaced it with less 
strict Affordable Clean Energy rules. 
 The Environmental Protection Agency has had its share of ups and downs over the years 
since its inception. The Agency was given a near unenforceable mandate by the original TSCA, 
and then receiving broad new powers under the revised bill. But these new powers will always 
be at the mercy of the administration in the White House at the time. Nixon, Ford, Carter, Bush 
41, Clinton, Obama seem to have given the Agency varying degrees of support, while Reagan, 
Bush 43, and Trump have attempted to pull the rug out from underneath it.   
United States vs. Europe  
According to Negev et al, “chemical regulations in individual countries are known to 
influence regulatory practices in other countries through trade” (2018, p. 463). Negev et al also 
stated that the two largest and most influential markets in the world were the United States and 
the European Union. The two regulatory systems act as informational role models to other 
countries that have attempted to avoid international trade barriers with the two large trading 
blocs (2018).  
Response of the United States 
That does not necessarily mean that the United States and European Union were in lock 
step with each other in their regulatory beliefs. The United States attempted to influence the 
world market by attempting to limit the growing influence of European Union since before 
REACH’s implementation. In reality, there was quite an underground resistance to the REACH 
legislation from the United States industry and the government. 
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According to Brown (2003):  
Industry groups such as the European Chemical Industry Council and the American 
Chemistry Council, as well as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have mounted major 
lobbying campaigns to ease REACH’s impact on business, asserting that REACH would 
cause widespread unemployment, deal a body blow to the U.S. economy and 
“deindustrialize” Europe by forcing manufacturers into the developing world. (p. 769) 
In the United States at the time of REACH’s implementation, when the chemical industry 
claimed information that was submitted to the EPA was a confidential trade secret, generally the 
EPA accepted as fact. If the submitted data revealed hazardous information, then the claim could 
have been challenged. If that information was found to not be confidential, then the EPA would 
be able to share the hazardous chemical data it had obtained (Sissell, 2007). “TSCA and REACH 
both protect confidential business information, but REACH requires greater public disclosure” 
(Sissell, 2007, p. 21). The amount of information that REACH would be able to share with the 
public was one of the unknowns that terrified the United States chemical industry.  
Even within the United States’ own borders, the concept of REACH was having an effect 
on certain states with a desire to have strong regulatory laws, much to the industry’s dismay 
(Black, 2008). Black offered the example that Maine was searching for a better way to regulate 
chemicals. An effort by the Governor of Maine in 2006 was heavily influenced by REACH’s 
effort to develop safer chemical alternatives. The Governor issued an executive order to create a 
“task force to come up with an overall policy requiring and offering incentives to develop safe 
chemicals in consumer products” (Black, 2008, p. 127). 
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While the ideas of the proposed REACH were spreading, as reported by Black (2008), 
the United States government appeared to be willing to help small to medium-sized companies 
with the rigors of REACH registration, at least in the public eye. Black stated that the U.S. 
Department of Commerce stated that their goal was to help prepare the small to medium sized 
companies with training on what data would be required of them, and when they would be 
required to submit it. However, the government’s effort may not have been completely 
wholehearted. According to R. Auerbach, who was responsible for REACH registration of his 
small to medium sized United States chemical company, “to my knowledge, the US Government 
did not do anything to help companies with REACH registration” (personal communication, 
September 11, 2019). 
The United States government was also actively attempting to interfere and undermine 
the REACH legislation before it was passed into law. Brown (2003) stated that a memo titled the 
United States Nonpaper on EU Chemicals Policy was circulated to United States embassies in 
the European Union in March 2002. Brown continued to state that Secretary of State Colin 
Powell was responsible for this distribution and encouraged the United States ambassadors to 
distribute the memo to trade and environmental groups in their assigned European countries. The 
memo “was unsigned and printed on plain paper without any U.S. government letterhead. It said 
REACH could distort global markets and violate World Trade Organization principles” (Brown, 
2003, p. 769). According to Brown, the language used in the memo matched other reports being 
prepared by United States industrial groups that were falsely claiming that the United States 
products would be banned by political pressure in Europe. 
Black (2008) described yet another United States effort to stave off REACH inspired influence in 
the western hemisphere: 
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In August 2007, in what could be thought of as the North American response to REACH, 
the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed an agreement in Montebello, Quebec, to 
assess 9,000 chemicals produced or imported in volumes of 25,000 pounds or more. The 
countries are required to complete risk characterization on these chemicals by 2012. By 
2020 the countries must have inventoried all chemicals currently in commerce. The 
agreement is aimed at sharing information and coordinating risk management of the 
chemicals. (p. 127) 
Response of the European Union 
The European Union was not entirely innocent with their attempts at world influence 
either, although their efforts appear to have better intentions. In the opinion of Heyvaert, Europe 
wanted to push their regulations as “an attempt to reel other regions into the European sphere of 
influence” (2009, p. 116). Lewis et al. (2006) state that REACH’s influence “will eventually 
have a much broader impact on chemicals policy and regulation initiatives as they begin to be 
implemented on a worldwide scale” (p. 592). The European Union was looking to export their 
chemical policy in an effort to build common ground and rapport “by opening scope for 
cooperation and exchange, in which process the EU, as the original architect of the regulatory 
format, is poised to take a central role” (Heyvaert, 2009, p. 117).  
With REACH’s implementation, Europe was using their newly-enhanced influence to 
supplant the United States as the world’s leader on chemical regulation. But their aspirations 
may have been much higher than just that. The European Union’s push for additional global 
influence coincided with a wide range of issues that Europe was making efforts to push toward 
their ideal solutions. Issues such as the “the meteoric rise of India and China on the global 
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market, the ascendance of complex and transboundary risks such as climate change on the global 
political agenda, to the waning intellectual and moral leadership of the United States” (Heyvaert, 
2009, p. 116).  
Worldwide Influence 
Some smaller countries, Israel for example, implemented their chemical regulatory rules 
based off of both the United States’ TSCA and Europe’s REACH (Negev et al., 2018). For 
example, “in 2016, Israel adopted the latest revision of the EU standard, which now regulates 18 
trace metals” (Negev et al, 2018, p. 465). According to Negev et al., their old standard had been 
limited to just eight trace metals, which matched the United States and the old European Union’s 
standard. With the potential effect on human health and restricted trade with the European 
Union, Israel chose to enact the tighter restriction.     
Heyvaert (2009) maintained that if regulatory conditions were to become more alike 
worldwide, then the required registration information will become much easier to prepare for 
submission. Small markets have always looked to the larger markets for guidance in regard to 
regulatory legislation. “Large regulated markets have both the expertise and resources to conduct 
comprehensive risk assessments, upon which a small market can rely. From a trade perspective, 
adopting standards of large markets reduces international trade barriers, both import and export” 
(Negev et al., 2018, p. 468).   
Conclusion 
This examination has touched on just two of the dozens of different regulatory systems 
across the world. The European Union’s REACH has been widely considered the toughest set of 
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regulations throughout the world, while the United States’ TSCA was one of the first major sets 
of regulations to attempt to govern industrial chemical manufacturing. However, it has taken 
major bipartisan reform to allow the EPA to have had a chance to become effective. 
A large portion of the chemical industry rallied against REACH from the start. The 
industry felt “the financial burden created by the new and extended data reporting, the testing 
and assessment provisions, and the authorization requirement would blight the chemical 
industry’s competitiveness on the world market” (Heyvaert, 2009, p. 114). Perhaps the chemical 
industry was scoffing at the notion that the burden of proof of chemical safety was shifted away 
from government and onto the manufacturers themselves. Or, it could have been that so many 
companies had to pay what could be construed as a tax, just for the privilege of potentially 
selling their products into the European Union. Or, it might have been the effect of increased 
scrutiny on the chemical market and the manufacturers occasional careless handling of their 
chemicals had caused harm to human and environmental health. It may have been all these 
reasons, a combination of them, or even another unnamed reason altogether that the chemical 
industry was anti-REACH.  
 On the other hand, the United States had an unenforceable and ineffective program under 
the original TSCA which was in place for over 40 years. Reform legislation with support from 
the chemical industry, who had hoped for a more streamlined nationalized set of rules, was 
passed in order to increase the strength of the EPA’s ability to enforce TSCA. The EPA was now 
able to regulate new, and more importantly, existing chemicals equally, without the phrase of 
‘least burdensome’ being held against them in judicial rulings. The EPA had a clear path to save 
lives and make better efforts to protect the environment from industrial contamination. Until, 
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only a few years later, the EPA’s funding was once again slashed by the whims of a new 
Presidential administration. 
  REACH came into being despite efforts of the chemical industry and the leadership in 
place at the time of the United States to thwart it. TSCA reform sprung out of a combination of 
public outrage, a form of peer pressure that was felt coming from Europe, and an elder 
politician’s crusade for reform. Both regulatory systems have merit and were created with the 
best of intentions to protect human health and attempt to better protect the world in which the 
human race exists. 
Effective chemical regulation has been seemingly gaining momentum throughout the 
world. More countries have begun to adopt REACH or TSCA regulations as their own in an 
effort to reduce trade barriers and make chemical registration easier on importers and 
manufacturers. Streamlining the required data may be the best way to appease the chemical 
industry as a whole.  
Will one set of these two regulations take precedence and become the worldwide 
standard? Heyvaert stated that “the globalization of regulation may limit opportunities for 
comparative learning and exchange, which narrows the basis for review and reform” (2009, p. 
121). Or in other words, the chemical regulatory world could settle on one method and accept 
that the findings discovered from a round of REACH or TSCA testing and apply the same data 
worldwide. While these findings may be true, there still will be other chemical unknowns that 
should be discovered. The scientific method teaches that results should be questioned, tests 
should be re-ran and verified, and very rarely does an answer stay the same forever. Vigilance 
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should continue to be practiced with an eye on future reform and refined test methods within the 
world of chemical regulations for the sake of the environment and our future generations. 
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